Pacific War, WW2 The Battle of Savo Island - August 9, 1942

Updates and Corrections on the Battle of Savo Island
Correspondence with LCdr Mackenzie J Gregory, R.A.N. (retired)

Hello From Australia,
I was interested with your description of Savo on the Net.
At the time of Savo. I was the Officer of the Watch in Canberra, you say we were hit by two torpedoes, we may have picked up one probably from Bagley, but certainly not two. I would be interested in your source of two torpedo hits.

That paragraph was taken from "United States Destroyer Operations in World War II" by Theodore Roscoe, published by U.S. Naval Institute Dec 1953". My copy is the authorized abridgment by Bantam War Books, 1979 (paperback). The pertinent references to Canberra include:

"On the port bow of CANBERRA, destroyer PATTERSON was the first Allied ship to sight the Japs. Instantly she radioed the alarm: "Warning! Strange ships entering the harbor" But the time was 0143. Already the Jap cruisers had launched torpedoes. And now brilliant flares, dropped by Jap floatplanes, illumined the anchorage off Lunga Point and silhouetted CANBERRA and CHICAGO. Simultaneously CHOKAI and two other Jap cruisers opened fire.

"A rain for shells fell on HMAS CANBERRA, and at the same time two torpedoes smashed into her starboard side. In an instant she was swaddled in flames and listing to starboard, disabled.
. . .
"On CANBERRA's starboard bow, destroyer BAGLEY swung hard left to fire a starboard torpedo salvo at the enemy cruisers. So sudden was the attack that the torpedoes could not be readied for this salvo. BAGLEY continued to circle until the port torpedoes were brought to bear. The salvo was fired, but by that time the Jap cruisers were beyond range.
. . .
"About 0300 of that hectic morning of Aug 9 destroyer PATTERSON was ordered by CHICAGO's Captain H.D.Bode to go to the assistance of disabled CANBERRA. As PATTERSON jockeyed alongside the burning Australian cruiser, the latter's ammunition began to explode. And it was not until about 0400 that Walker and his destroyermen were able to aid the Australians in fighting the inferno.
. . . 
"Destroyer BLUE came up at 0622 to aid CANBERRA, and she and PATTERSON took off the 680 Australian survivors, who were carried to the transport anchorage at Guadalcanal. About 0800, to prevent possible enemy capture, CANBERRA was torpedo-sunk by destroyer ELLET."

Why do you suspect BAGLEY (DD-386) fired the torpedo(s) when the Japanese fired sixty-one of their 24" torpedoes that night?

Another point, you say the Australian Pilot of the Hudson did not report his sighting of Mikawa, had tea on his return before debriefing. This is perpetuating the myth started by Morison in his history of US Naval operations.

This is a well published story approaching legend status as an ultimate example of indifference. The name is not important to history, but the act is. I would love to help correct history and will happily add a note or an entire new web page to correct injustice. The number of people surviving who can say, "I was there" is growing smaller each year. Can you send me more rounded information that will be of interest to our readers?

I have interviewed Stan Stutt the Hudson pilot plus his Navigator, and he did break radio silence to report his sighting, he did not take tea prior to his reporting to intelligence, in fact Stan Stutt does not even drink tea.

Why did you interview Stan Stutt? Are there any citations and references to records to show the true activities that readers can look up?

Post war records of Mikawa's actions confirm his radio; people had read and recorded Stutt's radio report of the finding.

Did this information become available after Morison's history? If we can document a reference, we can perhaps correct the popular misconception. You describe so many search planes in the area, how do we know which one's radio signal Mikawa intercepted?

May I respectfully suggest you amend your Savo story accordingly, and redress this slur on an Australian air crew from 1942?

If you can provide citable information, we will certain do our best.
In fact, I would suspect you have already approached the US Naval Institute about this.
Have they published a correction?

With regards.
Mackenzie J Gregory

Oh my, I just found your great web site with John G. Sauvageau
http://members.tripod.com/Tenika/savo.htm [updated]
You are a Lieutenant Commander, R.A.N. (retired) who has written on the subject. You don't need any help from me. You adequately repudiate the Hudson story. However, you do not explain why and how you know what each plane did, especially about Stutt. This will be of interest to readers and a certain level of documentation will be required to overcome the established story about the Hudson and tea. I will certainly revise my page and provide a link to your site. If you respond with amplification, I will include that, too. Our approaches to web page design are entirely different, so we will attract different audiences.

With greatest respect,
Jim Bauer     20Feb01

Jim,

Thank you for your gracious response.
This is going to be a long E-Mail to you and I apologize in advance.

Here goes:  Morison was published in 1951, Gill in his Vol 2 of the official history of the RAN in WW2. was probably the first to refute the story of the Hudson's role in sighting Mikawa's fleet.

Two later books published in Australia take up the Savo story.

1. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "Disaster in the Pacific. New Light on the Battle of Savo Island". Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1992.   [Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992.]
   
2. Loxton, B. with Coulthard-Clark, C. "The Shame of Savo. Anatomy of a Naval Disaster". Allen & Unwin. St.Leonards. NSW. 1994..   [Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1994.]

At the time of Savo, Bruce Loxton was the Captain's Midshipman on Canberra's bridge, he was severely wounded and, I did not think he could survive, but he did, to complete a distinguished Naval career, and retire as a Commodore. His service included a spell as Naval Attaché in Washington D.C. and Director of Naval Intelligence in Australia.

Bruce lives in Sydney, and I live in Melbourne, the two cities about 500 miles apart. As most of the RAN's records about Savo were housed in archives in Melbourne, I did a good deal of research for Bruce here in Melbourne.

As we wanted to learn about the Hudson's story first hand, and both the Hudson's pilot and navigator lived in Melbourne, Bruce flew to Melbourne, and we both interviewed former Sergeant Bill Stutt, the pilot, and Wilbur Courtis, the navigator over lunch. We discussed the aircraft's sighting of Mikawa, how they broke wireless silence to make an enemy report, and tried to raise their base at Fall River over a period of time but without success. Post war, it was discovered in RAAF records, in the signal log of ACH Townsville, that from 1032 to 1100, Fall River radio had closed because of an air raid alert.
Link to Hudson Aircraft Report

It was interesting to learn that at Stutt's briefing he was informed they might sight some US ships, but no mention was made about the WatchTower Operation, so, when they actually sighted the Japanese ships at 1025, on August 8 1942, they thought they were friendly. They were most surprised to discover that this sighting comprised 8 Japanese warships.
A Japanese floatplane was in the vicinity of the Japanese ships, and Stutt thought it was a Zero type fighter with floats that was out to attack him, and he quickly made off to the NW. On the way home they sighted two surfaced submarines, bombed them without success, then landed at Fall River at 1242, and were taken by a jeep for an immediate debriefing.

Flight Lieutenant Lloyd Milne had been in charge of the 5 Hudson's at Fall River, and had flown Hudson A16-157 that day, but did not sight Mikawa.
Another Hudson, A16-185, flown by Flying Officer Mervwn Williams had also sighted Mikawa at 1103, he also thought the force was friendly until Chokai opened fire, hitting this aircraft in three places with splinters. Williams withdrew, but unlike Stutt completed his mission, he did attempt to send an enemy report to Falls River, but was told to maintain radio silence. William's debriefing officer for some inexplicable reason failed to accept his enemy report of 2 heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 1 small unknown type ( he had not sighted all 8 of Mikawa's ships.)
Although Williams had a blazing row with his debriefing officer, he did not convince him about the ships sighted, he gave up, noted his sighting in his log book as well as the damage to his aircraft.

Jim, the various times reported in different accounts of Savo need to be clarified.
The Japanese Fleet kept -9 time ( ie 9 hours ahead of GMT ) the Hudsons kept -10 time ( ie 10 hours ahead of GMT ) whilst at Guadalcanal, the Allied Force kept -11 time ( ie 11 hours ahead of GMT ). Thus the Hudson's first sighting of Mikawa at 1025, was 0925 for Mikawa, and, 1125 at Guadalcanal.

In Chokai, Stutt's enemy report had been intercepted. Lloyd Milne's wife Nancy had been trying to document the Hudson's sighting of Mikawa, and that the flagship had read and recorded Stutt's radio transmission. Her husband Lloyd had died, and in 1983 Nancy contacted Commander Sadao Seno a retired Japanese Naval Officer, ( he had worked with the Warners on their book: "Kamikaze. The Sacred Warriors 1944-45" )

Seno found in Chokai's action report a record of the interception of the Hudson's message. ( whilst no formal copy of Chokai's action report had survived post war, an Engineer officer had kept an illegal copy he had made, it was amongst papers he gave to the Japanese National Institute of Defense in 1963 )
The Institute has authenticated this copy, and Bruce Loxton received a letter from Captain Itonoga dated 8 August 1990, confirming this fact. At long last, Stutt and his crew had been vindicated.

---

Now to Bagley, and the possibility of Canberra picking up one of her torpedoes.

By our early maneuvers, I believe we evaded the Japanese torpedoes, all their attack came from our port side, I vividly recall being at my action station in the fore control above the bridge which I had recently left, looking out to port at the looming Japanese cruisers, no more than a few thousand yards away, with them firing at us, and remarking out loud. "My God this is bloody awful." We had listed quite heavily to starboard, consistent with water rushing in a hole on our starboard side as a result of a torpedo hit on that side of the ship. In "The Shame of Savo", Bruce Loxton, with track charts, using both Bagley's and Canberra's turning circles, the position of Bagley, on our starboard side, the timing of her firing her torpedoes etc, mounts a compelling argument for one of Bagley's torpedoes finding us.

I have not seen any response from the USA, or any other source that refutes his claim since his book came out in 1994.

I sincerely believe at this distance from the night in question, that from Loxton's work, Canberra was torpedoed on her starboard side amidships, at about 0147 on August 9 1942, and that Bagley had fired that torpedo.

Wow! I have gone on a long time Jim, again I apologize, if you have any more questions please fire them off to me.

It would be great if you put a link on your page to AHOY.

John Sauvageau, who has looked after my site since inception, is about to retire from such activities, and I will need to learn how to look after it myself. John is preparing a CD to help in that direction. I have now completed work on "Marauders of the Sea. Armed German Merchant Ships of WW1", this is to round out these ships in WW2 already on my site, so it will in due course complete this work.   So!   I will have much to keep me busy in the future.

It is great to meet you via the Web, please do keep in touch.

Best regards.
Mac.
macden "each-sign" melbpc "period" org "another-period" au

AHOY Naval Reminiscences.
Click on - HMAS Canberra to read about the Battle of Savo Island, and page about - Hudson observations.
"I complained because I had no shoes, until I met a man who had no feet."
Recent honors and close shave in Terrorist Attack Sept 11.

Notes:
1. Operation Watchtower is the 1st Marine Division (MGen Vandegrift, USMC) landing on Florida, Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Guadalcanal, in the first American land offensive of the war. Amphibious Force, South Pacific (RAdm Turner, TF-62,) with screening force (RAdm Crutchley, RN) landed the leathernecks under cover of naval surface and air forces (VAdm Fletcher). Landings are supported by carrier aircraft (RAdm Noyes) and shore-based aircraft (RAdm McCain). Overall Commander South Pacific Force is VAdm Ghormley; officer in tactical command is VAdm Fletcher.
2. The Imperial Japanese Eighth Fleet was commanded by VAdm Mikawa with his flag on Chokai consisted of:
   Heavy Cruiser Division 6 (RAdm Goto) on Aoba with Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa,
   Light Cruiser Division 18 (RAdm Matsuyama) on Tenryu with Yubari,
   Screen destroyer Yunagi.
3. Americans understand "tea" to be an afternoon meal in which the beverage drunk is unimportant.
4. The floatplane version of the Zero fighter is a Nakajima A6M2-N "Rufe" with a speed of 271 mph, range 1,100 miles, and armament of one 7.7mm and two 20mm; used in the Solomons.
5. The Lockheed Hudson was a militarized Super Electra passenger liner (Army A-29, Navy PBO-1) for maritime reconnaissance with a top speed of 246 mph, a range of 1,960 miles, and armament of 2 forward firing 7.7mm and usually a dorsal turret with two 7.7mm (.303 cal) and depth charges. The Solomon's are 1,200 miles from Australia, so Fall River airfield was at Milne Bay, New Guinea rather than near Townsville, Australia.
6. The time zone changes in the vast Pacific is a worthy point. Also, the international date line separates Washington and Hawaii from Tokyo and Sydney.
7. The Pacific War zones of control were separated between Army (MacArthur in Australia) with the Southwest Pacific and the Navy (Nimitz in Hawaii) with the North, Central and South Pacific. Operation Watchtower, a navy operation, required moving the line of demarcation from 160 degrees west to 158 degrees west. The search area overlapped command responsibilities in addition to time zones.
8. In defense of Morison (Naval Historian): the Hudson's saw the task force and the information did not get to the fleet off Savo Island. Delete the part about going to "tea" and replace it with a radio station off the air from an air raid alert or an ignorant debriefing officer. Further study might even find a reason for the apparent arrogance of the debriefing officer; few servicemen in combat zones are intentionally obstructive.¹
9. LCDR Gregory's web page makes note that USAAF B-17's also saw the Japanese 8th fleet. McCain had responsibility for both US Army and Navy shore based aircraft, but the Australian planes belonged to SW Pacific area, a separate chain of command.
10. Australian planes of MacArthur's SW Pacific command were flying out of an emergency field on the tip of New Guinea, the Hudson's sighting report path was : by radio from Milne Bay to Port Moresby,  to Townsville,  to Brisbane ; then by motor cycle to MacArthur's HQ, by telephone to Canberra, and finally by radio to the fleet at Pearl Harbor for broadcast (Fox) to all ships , decoding and delivery the flag officer along with dozens of other messages. The elapsed time until Turner received the message was about seven and a half hours, during which time Fletcher withdrew the carrier fleet from the confines of Solomons into the Coral Sea.
    -----
    ^1. Tony writes -- " I was a postwar member of the Royal Australian Airforce. In the course of my training I was informed that the reason that the debriefing officer had a mind block about believing a pilot's report of sighting a Japanese cruiser force heading towards Savo was that Macarthur's heaquarters had been so tight with security on the US landings that they had not even informed the Australian airforce that they were planned or had taken place. The plane was on a routine mission unconnected with the landings. Likely result could be that the de briefing officer could see no rational reason for such a Japanese force heading south ,and he certainly had tried to rationalise the report as a sighting of routine inter island traffic with perhaps seaplane carriers included. The sighting report was radiod in clear as the pilot knew he had been sighted by the Japanese cruisers, he could well be shot down and there was no point in coding his message as the Japanese would be well aware of what message he would be sending."
    Grahm writes -- " My great uncle was the wireless operator in Stutt's crew. Radio silence was well and truly broken on this occasion as he broadcast the warning in plain language due to the fact that the Japanese were trying to shoot them down. However the signals were unfortunately not taken seriously by those that received them."

    ---

    Subject: Battle At Savo
    From: "Daniel
    Date: Mon, August 29, 2011  
        I am a survivor of the sinking of USS Quincy CA -39 now 90 years of age , have just finished reading your account of the Battle "AT" Savo Island .It is my custom to recall the names of my shipmates K I A [ 389 ] each anniversary . Your accounting of the Battle is accurate , although death by ammunition fires was most likely the major cause of death . Once the sea water entered through the torpedo made hole , the fire was extinguished throughout the ship . During the " Abandon Ship " ordered by Lt Com. Henneburger, Gunnery Officer [ I was his Talker on the phones ] he being the Senior Surviving Officer, gave the battle account from his perspective, from our Battle Station Control Forward . I am presently attempting writing a Biography , and of course SAVO recollections will be therein !
    Daniel , Fire Controlman, First Class
    U. S. Navy 1940 - 1952 .
    
    A snippet from his coming biography, "The Petty Officer "
        "Recalling the most prominent memory of my life is not a problem of sifting through a lot of trivia, the one memory that has screamed at me for 69 years is this one ! I am standing high above the bridge on a United States Navy Heavy Cruiser, during the complete blackness of a South Pacific night during a rain storm . We have invaded the Japanese held Island with the First Marine Division making a landing without resistance from the enemy . All seems to be very acceptable and "Normal ." I am alerted to the sound of an aircraft engine , I wonder why the Navy would cause to put a pilot up in this weather ? Another " Odd Ball " thing was my seeing a large ship out of formation, passing our stern at very close quarters , maybe 50 yards , showing a complete port side view in passing ! None of this was in any way in focus due to the rain and the blackness of midnight . I considered the ship I witnessed a " Ghost Ship ". And thought, somebody had better shape up with their navigation ! Suddenly , " The Ghost Ship " had turned on two Green Truck lights on its yardarm -- what is going on here ? A few seconds later the lights were turned off and BLAMM, heavy gunfire killed the silence, starshells were floating over the Vincennes and exploding shell fire caused the aircraft on its catapults to burst into flame ! I was in state of confounding, total confusion. I see this happening -- but I don't believe it, can't get it all focused in my mind !
        While trying to make some sense of all this , I was at my Watch Station in Sky Forward, when my relief arrived I went a few feet below that place and entered my Battle Station, Control Forward . Installed therein was the large rotating optics , pointer , trainer, cross leveler , and the Control Officer, who had an overhead hatch that he used to get an eye-ball look outside to quickly locate the target . Although RAdio Detection And Ranging, RADAR, had been installed a month ago, we used our understandable Optics - always !
        Suddenly, the total optical crew leaped from their positions, soaklng wet ! LtCmdr Henneburger, Gunnery Officer, commanded " Get back to your stations. "The men obediently and quickly went back to their Battle Stations . At this height above the water line we never felt the blast from the torpedo that hit our ship's hull under turret 2 . The geyser caused by the exploding torpedo rose higher than our elevated height, then collapsed downward through the Control Officers viewing hatch, making all hands alert but wet. Immediately the terrible ammunition FIRE flashed to engulf the whole ship . The Japanese photo of our blazing ship shows the magnitude of the fire that roasted our deck sailors trying to maintain their battle stations . When the damaged hull allowed sufficient sea water to rapidly rush inside , the fires seemed to extinguish immediately . LtCmdr Hennenburger ordered " ABANDON SHIP ! ", the dazed men began the trip down the series of ladders to the 5 inch gun decks and to the lower well deck .
        Inquisitive me began to go forward to inspect the damage, when I felt fine wires on my face that alarmed me to be careful -- you may get shocked ! Placing my shoes neatly under the life lines, just as the ship in it's death throes listed a full 90 degrees, causing me to frantically grab those life lines now located over my head, and with all my available strength pull myself upwards, finally on my feet, and running across the starboard hull and into the water . After swimming a few strokes, I watched the USS Quincy CA-39, my home and man of war, slide into the waves, the 48 star flag still flying its final wave, and the propellers still flopping over."