Pacific War of WW2
    The Battle of Savo Island - August 9, 1942

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    Updates and Corrections on the Battle of Savo Island
    with Reference to Australian Air Scouting Report

    • Correspondence with Eric Goeddes, RAAF radio operator
    • A Slur upon Australian Airman by Samuel Morison
    • To the President of the United States of America
    • Were the Hudsons to be Blamed for the Naval disaster at Guadalcanal? by Captain Emile I. Bonnot USNR (ret)
      Historian General Emeritus, Naval Order of the United States; 23 February 1988.
    • Japanese Action Report - from IJN Flagship, Chokai
    • Letter of Commendation ; No 32 Squadron . pic
    • Events Contributing to Defeat -- comments by Eric
    • Additional Comments -- by webmaster
    • Correspondence with LCDR Gregory, Watch Officer on HMAS Canberra when the torpedoes hit the Allied Cruisers at Savo.

    1 . Correspondence with Eric Geddes, R.A.A.F., radio operator

    The following is e-mail correspondence with one who was there. He was referred to our WW2 Pacific web site by a nephew who was in contact with LCdr Gregory. and has provided the documentation for this web page. His first hand observations are about Australian air reconnaissance in the area. His text is in navy. I responded with my comments interspersed within his text.  His response amplifying the issues, follows in full. This will be new information to American audiences. hudson 
    
Date:   	Wed, December 5, 2007 12:05 am

Dear Jim,

I understand that you have been communicating with my nephew concerning that
debacle named Savo and I confirm that I am the Eric Geddes responsible for
that signal which according to Samuel Morrison and Richard Newcombe was
never transmitted and I still wonder about that "tea and apple pie"scenario
we were still repelling the Jap invasion of Milne Bay. To give some
indication of the food situation there at the time we,as a crew were flying
up to 8 hour patrols with in flight rations of 1x850 gm tin of preserved
pears to be shared and 1 packet each of 4 dog biscuits. On reflection I
guess that under the circumstances all that luxury could equate to tea and
apple pie.

Aside from that little bit of trivia what is there in your research that you
believe I may be able to clarify or add to? My conclusion has been that all
that remains to lay the whole debate to rest was to convince an authority in
America with sufficient  moral integrity to ensure that the truth of the
whole sorry episode is officially processed into your history books so every
student in America studying the subject will know the truth.  I am about to
embark on that very project at a high level of government in your country
however I have enough political awareness to know that the "too hard tray"
is a haven to evade any action or the question is finally passed on to a
junior clerk to take care of, unfortunately this is a political process in
all countries.

If anything eventuates in the New Year to justify a celebration I will give
you all the detail to include in your research. Please feel free to ask
questions if I am able to deliver sensible answers then I will certainly do
so.

                                                Kindest Regards
						Eric Geddes
==================
Hi Eric,
	Glad to hear from you.
	I had once quoted the Morison statement about "tea"
and was called to account by Mackenzie Gregory, office of the deck
when HMAS Canberra was hit.  He writes on a lot of naval topics
and has been to Washington, DC, representing Canberra.  He will
help get attention to the issue.  Whereas I am a simple webmaster
who publishes the facts and hope people find them.  I have forwarded
your email to Mac.

	http://www.ww2pacific.com/savoupdt.html  -- my page about this.
	http://www.ww2pacific.com/mac011119.html -- Mac meeting with President Bush
	http://www.ww2pacific.com/stories.html#wireless -- notes from Graham and you.

All best and a salute to you and your service,
Jim

     
Date:   	Wed, May 19, 2010 4:57 am
Hi Jim,
Considerable time has passed since I last communicated with you and now time is not
something I can treat lightly,
 68 years have passed since the debacle called Savo. 61 years since Morison lied to
the American public presumably
to clear the American Navy of any culpability in such a devastating defeat and place
the blame on four foreign airmen [Australian] who had in fact performed their duty
correctly and with distinction a " Letter of Commendation"
from Major General Kenny is part of the documented evidence supporting the action of
the RAAF aircrew.
For many years I have attempted to have this matter resolved in the diplomatic arena
in America but Presidents who say "The Buck Stops With Them'"don't really mean
that,President Bush and President Obama have probably considered this too menial or
have very diligent bureaucrats who have shuffled my submissions into the "Do Not
Follow Up Tray"
Three of my crew are now deceased, they have died without th benefit of justice and
at 92 I feel that time is now at a premium for me .
I have a question for any politicians in America or any American citizen who may
read this."What action would you take if you were accused by faked evidence to be
responsible for the death of 1023 combined American and Australian sailors and the
wounding of 763 more without the right to present a case in defence. Do you think
JUSTICE has been served in this case?" 
If you would like a copy in detail of the truth about Savo please feel free to email
me and I will forward the documentation to you; my file would take up too much space
in an email.
Best wishes to you Jim
                                Eric Geddes

==================
Dear Eric,

	It is good to hear from you again.
	As one of the few American sources of information about the true actions of the Australian
Wireless Message warning of the approaching Japanese towards Savo Island, I would like to have your documentation to
share with readers interested in finding the truth behind the myth started by Morison.  Morison is no friend of mine,
his repeated attacks upon Adm Fletcher, the most successful admiral of the century who sank six enemy aircraft
carriers in sea combat, and  is given no credit by Morison.  Morison worked for the Navy which was 
pleased to have the Navy story told -- because the public had been told by the press that the Air Force 
had won the war -- so that the Navy tolerated occasional errors that sacrificed some individuals such as you, 
your crew mates, and Fletcher. 
 
	I will extract the most interesting parts of your documentation to create a web page and
offer to provide your documentation to those interested in greater detail.  (I am only 72.)  I can
promise no direct contact with or influence with "politicians".  But I can promise to try with the
Internet to correct his slur upon an Australia flight crew.
================

14May2010

 Hi Eric,
      You packet of documentation arrived today.
      I anticipate putting the whole thing on the
internet.  It will take a few days to get it scanned,
converted to web pages, and uploaded.  I will tell
you as soon as it is available for your approval
and correction.
	For those who find the web page, this will present the
the truth that has fallen into an incorrect mythology
	Thanks and you will be hearing from me shortly.
All best,
Jim

    2 . Slur upon Australian Air Force by Morison

    "The Struggle for Guadalcanal"
    History of United State Naval Operations in World War II
    Volume 5 of 15 ; page 25-26


        First air-search contact, as we have seen, was that of MacArthur's Flying Forts on Mikawa's cruisers south of Kavieng on 7 August. Their report reached Admiral Turner before midnight, but the presence of cruisers close to a naval base was no cause for alarm.   Second contact was made by submarine S-38 south of Cape St. George after nightfall on the 7th. The hight speed and southeasterly course of the enemy indicated an urgent mission. Admiral Crutchley received this intelligence about breakfast time next morning, but awaited amplification by a nearer contact (the ships were then 550 miles from Guadalcanal) before assuming that they were after him.   The third sighting, by the Australian Hudson at 1026 August 8, would have been the tip-off but for several unfortunate circumstances. The pilot of this plane, [An Australian Hudson, on search mission FR-623 originating at Milne Bay, New Guinea.] instead of breaking radio silence to report as he had orders to do in an urgent case, or returning to base which he could have done in two hours, spent most of the afternoon completing his search mission, came down at Milne Bay had his tea, and then reported the contact. About sundown August 8 this vital information was finally sent to Townsville, which originated a dispatch to General MacArthur's headquarters at Brisbane. From that moment there was prompt action; Radio Canberra at 1817 put the contact report on "Bells," from which Admiral Crutchley got it at 1839 ; Canberra also sent it to Pearl Harbor, where it was placed on "Fox," from which Admiral Turner got it at 1845.10 Thus it took over eight hours to pass ultra-hot intelligence only 350 miles from a search plane to the Allied flagship. If the pilot's report had been made by radio, MacArthur could have sent out a search mission to track the ships and bombers to harass them. If the aviator had flow back to base immediately and his report had been transmitted promptly, Turner could have requested additional searches from that side. And any such search, despite foul weather in the Slot, might with fair luck have corrected another fatal defect, the unfortunate wording of the Australian pilot's report : "Three cruisers, three destroyers, two seaplane tenders or gunboats, course 120°, speed 15 knots."
        Turner and Crutchley, recent recipients of vicious air attacks, are not to blame for pouncing on the "two seaplane tenders" to infer that the enemy planned an air strike tomorrow rather than a surface strike that night. . . .
    ----------
      10. The message of the second Hudson that sighted Mikawa at 1101 was similarly delayed ; it reached Ghormley [at Noumea,New Caledonia] at 2136 and Turner got it about an hour later. "Bells" was the Australian counter part to "Fox,"
      ** "Fox" was a powerful, long-range, very low-frequency broadcast, one dispatch following immediately on the heels of another, transmitted several times a day on a fixed schedule. A 24-hour guard of Fox was required on board all ships, and operators copied all headings ... and gave to the coding officer only what was addressed to his ship.
    ===================
    Morison was so enthused with this story that he repeated it in his one volume summary of the war, "Two Ocean Navy", page 168.
    Owing to a series of blunder on our side, the Slot was not properly covered by air search on 8 August, and the one sighting of Mikawa's force that day, by an Australian Hudson pilot at 1026, was so mishandled by him, as well as by the authorities who passed it along, that Admiral Turner did not receive it until over eight ours had passed. This contact report, moreover was misleading, in that the pilot mistook two Japanese cruiser for seaplane tenders. On that basis Turner made the bad guess that the Japanese were not coming through that night, but intended to set up a seaplane base at Santa Isabel Island, some 10 miles from Savo, and attack later.
    ---------------
    To understand the minimum of 8 hours to get information transferred, see Note 10.
    There were two RAAF Hudson sightings. Turner's bad guess was doubly wrong.

    3 . To The President of the United States of America

    E. Geddes
    Bardwell Park 2207
    N.S.W., Australia.
    8th April 2009.

    The President of the United States of America
    The White House,
    1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W
    Washington D.C. 20500
    U.S.A.

    Dear Sir,

        It is very difficult for me to compose this communication in a form which in the first place will preclude it being consigned to the waste paper basket as useless material from some "Nutter Down Under" and secondly to create enough interest for those who first determine the direction in which my letter should proceed to direct it to a position on your desk where you, in spite of the burden of your national and international commitments, will find it in your heart to personally peruse the attached material and advise me of your conclusions.

        Please allow me to introduce myself. My name is Eric Geddes aged 90 a retired member of the Royal Australian Air Force and a Veteran of World War II who at one stage was based with and flew missions in B24 Liberators with the USAAF 531st Squadron of the 380th Bomb Group in New Guinea during April of 1944 where I flew as a member of an RAAF crew attached to the 531st.

        Prior to that in 1942, I had completed an operational tour, also in New Guinea, flying Hudsons and was a participant in the successful denial to the Japanese, of Milne Bay as a base for their aircraft to counter the successes which American forces were having in that theatre, with special regard to the struggle for Guadalcanal which had just commenced in August of 1942. This theatre, and the events which followed, on the 8th and 9th of that month created headline banners in the world press.

        The year 1942, was very significant for our combined forces. It was a critical year for both our countries. We had our gains and we had our losses, but in all partnerships there are areas of grey where loyalties may be questioned. I refer here to the field of Historical Journalism where I believe responsible journalism should be based on credible sources and strict verification of facts. The real issue is not one of the right to free expression, but whether any government should tolerate malicious journalism and do nothing about it.

        May I direct your thoughts to a part of American Naval History dated 8th and 9th August 1942 when a Japanese Naval Squadron caused your country to suffer it's worst blue water defeat in it's history with the loss in the battle of Savo of 3 American cruisers and 1 Royal Australian Navy Cruiser, HMAS Canberra, on which 10 officers and 74 ratings were killed, also 10 officers, 96 ratings and 3 civilians wounded.
    Of the American ships the following applied.

    ShipKilled  Wounded
    USS VINCENNES332258
    USS QUINCY370167
    USS ASTORIA216186
    USS CHICAGO221
    USS RALPH TALBOT  811
    USS PATTERSON33211

    A total of 1023 killed and 763 wounded.

        After 66 years I still honour all of those men and my prayers have always been for those left to mourn their passing and that in their family histories they will be forever heroes.

        Mr President, the purpose of this letter is to appeal to the sense of justice which I know to be part of the American psyche else why would LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, two beautiful words of the English language, be embedded in your culture. We in our Democracy have Liberty in abundance but there are times when Justice comes in a shade of grey.

        The attached summary defines the area of grey which led to a final determination of the cause of the Savo debacle and it will disclose the personal connection of Sergeants William Stutt, Eric Geddes, Wilbur Courtis and John Bell, all of whom were defamed by two American War Correspondents namely Samuel Morison and Richard Newcomb who, in their analysis of the battle, used the media and the official investigation of the event to convince the authorities and the American public that the RAAF crew were so derelict in their duties that the terrible loss of 1023 killed and 763 wounded rested with their actions when they sighted Admiral Mikawa's Naval Squadron. They reported that when we finally arrived back at Milne Bay we indulged in tea and apple pie before we proceeded to operations to verbally report our sighting. We were at a loss to understand what war those gentlemen were reporting. It sure as hell wasn't the one we were fighting. Perhaps apple pie was on the menu for them, but we were flying daily missions of up to 8 hours duration with in flight rations of 1 x 850gm tin of preserved pears shared between 4 and 1 packet each of 4 dog biscuits.

        Sergeants Courtis and Bell are now deceased and Sergeant Stutt, due to illness, is a resident of a nursing home. Consequently it remains with me to make this audacious approach for you to confirm that the real history of that sighting is the one which is being taught in your schools, bearing in mind that for Justice to be served, the accused must be given the opportunity to present their case to the examining judiciary. To this day we have not enjoyed that luxury.

        Books have been written on this subject to try and clarify the details and the only acknowledgement from America indicating acceptance of the Australian version of events comes from Captain Emile L Bonnot USNR (Ret) who forwarded all the relevant information to Dr Dean Allard (Senior Historian of the Naval Historical Centre), in Washington DC.

        The attached summary is the true version of events authenticated and documented for the benefit of all concerned. It is my belief Mr President that your grandchildren would applaud you for appending your signature to a document, which would enshrine in your history, a truth so badly tarnished. It is my fervent desire that before I become just a memory that I will be able to show my children, grandchildren and great grandchildren and the families of my crew mates that the President of the United States of America is prepared to whiten the grey area of Justice and have the true version of events recorded in your history books. We and your nation were comrades in arms in WW II. We shared the good and the bad so now after 66years let us polish the sword of Justice and get the history right.

        This injustice to my comrades and I must not be perpetuated in your historical records nor through the media. Allow us to leave a legacy of honour and respect for dedication to duty in a combat situation shared with your country, then that proud symbol of LIBERTY and JUSTICE will remain untarnished and our descendents will bless you for it.
                Yours Sincerely
                  Eric Geddes

      Printable PDF version - 4 pages

    4 . Were the Hudsons to be Blamed for the Naval Disaster at Gualcanal?
    Captain Emile I. Bonnot, USNR (Ret)
    Historian General Emeritus
    Naval Order of the United States
    23 February 1988

        The first battle of Savo Island fought in the dead of night 8-9 August 1942 following the successful landing on Guadalcanal on 7 August, was the worst defeat the US Navy had ever suffered in battle. A powerful Allied covering force, including an Australian Cruiser, were surprised and reduced to a shambles by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa with five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and a destroyer.

        Samuel Elliot Morison, Richard Newcomb and other writers have placed the blame for the disaster on the pilot and crew of an Australian Hudson plane that sighted Mikawa's force at 10:26 on the morning of 8th August. These writers stated, sometimes naming the pilot, William J Stutt, that the pilot did not break radio silence to make his contact report, spent most of the afternoon completing his search mission, came down at his Milne Bay Base, had tea and apple pie and then leisurely reported the contact about sundown on the eighth. Similarly blame was placed on a second Hudson, piloted by Lloyd Milne.

        Knowing that these statements were untrue, the pilot of the 'first Hudson, William J Stutt and his crew, Eric Geddes, Wilbur Courtis and John Bell all sergeants at the time, have lived under this cloud of disgrace for over forty years. In addition Stutt has been rankled over the mention of tea, contrary to Australian custom, he disliked tea, not having had ten cups of tea in his entire life.

    In all the enquiries that followed concerning the disaster, including the official Australian enquiry into the loss of the HMAS Canberra, these four were never interrogated.

        A few Australians, among them W F Martin Clemens, who is a Companion of the Naval Order of the United States and the coast watcher hero on Guadalcanal, Mrs Lloyd Milne, the wife of the pilot of the second Hudson that sighted Mikawa 35 minutes after Stutt's sighting; G. Herman Gill who prepared the Official History of the Royal Australian Navy1942-45 (published in 1969) and A J Sweeting, General Editor of Official War History, became interested in clearing away the unjustified cloud that hung over the men. The documents which proved that the crew of Hudson A16-218 of the 32nd Squadron did a proper job on their mission on 8th August 1942. A recountal of the flight follows.

        In the early hours of 8th of August 1942 at the RAAF Fall River Base Milne Bay, New Guinea, a Hudson A16-218 of 32 Squadron was being readied for an armed reconnaissance mission over Bougainville Island, the Japanese controlled waters and the islands to the east. The Fall River Base was part of the Allied Southwest Pacific Command of General Douglas MacArthur. The Hudson crew of four, were Sergeant William J Stutt, pilot in command, Sergeant Wilbur Courtis, Navigator, Sergeant Eric Geddes, Radio Operator, and Sergeant John Bell, Gunner, all just graduated from Advanced Training School in Australia. The four were briefed in the Operations Room located in a native style thatched hut near the air strip. In the briefing they were given their search pattern, the mission "to search for Japanese submarines and surface craft activity" and received the identifying code letter of the day. During the short briefing there was a mention about the possibility of encountering Allied shipping at sea in the waters over which they would fly. They received no information on the large scale landings made on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. This information was deliberately withheld as it would have been a great liability and strain if they were forced down and captured. They would know nothing if they were interrogated and tortured. As it turned out, it would have been better if they had been informed as they might have been able to take more time and give a more accurate identification of the ships they sighted in Mikawa's force.

        The Hudson A16-218 being ready, the four crewmen took off at 6:15 am local time as per the Fall River log. The lumbering Lockheed Hudson searched the sea west of Bougainville Island, the largest island in the Solomon's chain, and climbed for altitude to overfly the mountains on Bougainville. As they were breaking through the cloud cover on the descent about 30 miles east of Kieta, they were startled to see a striking force of eight ships. Because of the briefing about Allied shipping, they thought it was possible that the ships were friendly.

        Stutt took the plane down and flew briefly on a parallel course of 120 degrees. Geddes flashed the Aldis Lamp requesting the "letter of the day" There were a couple of flashes from the ships which Geddes at first thought were flashes from an Aldis Lamp in reply to his challenge. But Geddes quickly decided they were gun flashes and not the signal from an Aldis Lamp. At the same time, two float planes were seen being launched from the ships and heading toward them. Stutt recognised them as Zero float planes which left no doubt in his mind that the ships were Japanese.

        With the anti-aircraft bursts appearing as puffs of black smoke around the plane and the Zero float planes trying to gain altitude and heading toward them, Stutt knew he had to get away. His mission was basically reconnaissance not combat. He had to get off a message. He climbed and headed for which little cloud cover there was over Bougainville. When Stutt thought he was out of sight in a cloud, he decided it was time to break radio silence and report to Fall River.

        It was 10:26 am when radio operator Geddes sent a message to their RAAF Fall River Base at Milne Bay. The message reported the sighting and gave composition of the force as they believed it to be.

    The Message:RAAF Hudson
      - Sighted Japanese force
      - Three Cruisers
      - Three Destroyers
      - Two Seaplane Tenders or Gunboats
      - Latitude 0549S - Longitude 156-07E
      - Course120 degrees - Speed 15 Knots

        Sergeant Geddes who sent the message received no response from Fall River. The Base was blacked out by violent electric storms in the area and could not receive it.

        Martin Clemens, while coast watching on Guadalcanal, says he had similar problems trying to transmit to Townsville, Australia. Sergeant HG Holland on mght A16157- 32 Squadron tried to raise Fall River about the same time without success. He called the radio phenomenon "skip distance and area"

        Others did copy the message, however, not the least being Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa himself.

        Mrs. N Milne, Wife of Lloyd Milne, pilot of Hudson A16-185, who sighted some of Mikawa's ships 35 minutes after Stutt's sighting, wrote in 1984 to Sadao Seno who had been in Mikawa's fleet and who had aided Dennis and Peggy Warner in writing their book "Kamikase, The Sacred Warrior" asking whether he could verify any of these facts on the Hudson's sighting. Seno replied on 15 September 1984 that he had found the account in the Detailed Action Report of Admiral Gunichi Mikawa's flagship Chokai, which is preserved in the Library of War History, Department of the National Defence College, where all remaining war documents are preserved.

    Sado Seno reported that Mikawa had logged the following:

        "At 0903: Recognised the plane which had kept following us and drove it off by main battery fire. The plane found our fleet. Intercepted its report as follows: At 0927- three cruisers, three destroyers, two seaplane tenders or gunboats, 0549S, 156-07E, course120 degrees at 15 knots."

        Mikawa listed the time of the interception of the message on Tokyo time, which was the time used by the Japanese fleet. Converting the time to local time, it was the exact time that Geddes said he radioed his message to his Fall River Base.

        The cruiser USS ASTORIA probably intercepted the message. The Captain, Lt. Cmdr. Walter B Davidson said he had a report in the morning which he believed came from Coast Watchers, but no Coast Watchers sent such a message. Jack Reid was on the northern coast of Bougainville and saw nothing of the ships. Paul Mason was on the southern coast of Bougainville. Mason on Malaita Hill, had done a priceless job in reporting the flight of enemy aircraft but Mikawa's force had passed 40 miles to the east and out of his range of vision. There were no Coast Watcher reports

        A Melbourne radio station copied the message but it being addressed to Fall River, they presumed that any action required would originate from there.

        Admiral Hepburn's investigative report mentions that Captain Reifkohl of the USS VINCENNES "became aware of the contact during the afternoon." Captain Reifkohl made mention of it in his Orders.

        In the Australian enquiry into the sinking of HMAS CANBERRA the survivor Cmdr. E. J. Wright, Intelligence Officer and Control Officer of the aft 8" guns, stated that when he came off watch at sunset they already had the report of 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 2 aircraft tenders, but he said they thought the ships were operating between Rabaul and Buka Passage.

        Admiral Crutchly wrote that he had the report during the day. Naval Order Companion, Captain Elias B Mott ESN (Retired), then a Lieutenant and Assistant Gunnery Officer and Anti- Aircraft Officer on the USS ENTERPRISE, said they had the report in the early afternoon of the 8th and put it on their Status Board. From the position given, they had plotted it and estimated that if the force continued on to Guadalcanal, it could be expected around 1am on the 9th.

        Meanwhile Sergeant Stutt in the Hudson, having sent the message but not getting any acknowledgement, decided he had to get back to Milne Bay as quickly as possible. He climbed over the mountains on Bougainville and at his top cruising speed of 180 knots set a bee- line course for the Base, expecting a return flight of two hours

        After leaving Bougainville behind, Stutt had not gone far over the water when Sergeant Wilbur Courtis through his binoculars sighted two large vessels which he could not identify. Stutt circled and brought the plane lower, took the binoculars and recognised them as submarines on the surface. The Rising Sun on the conning towers told him they were Japanese.

        As the submarines attempted to dive, Sergeant Stutt or Courtis opened the bomb bay doors and Stutt released a stick of bombs on the first submarine which were near misses. Stutt continued on the next diving submarine and dropped another stick. One bomb appeared to be a direct hit.

        As the bombs were being dropped, Sergeant Geddes reported that here was a lot of Japanese radio traffic (RT) originating nearby. He said it was probably from the submarines but added that aircraft might also be nearby.

        Knowing that at least one of two Japanese planes had taken off in an attempt to get them, Stutt did not linger to see the results of their bombing but quickly regained altitude and again headed for base. Attacking the target of opportunity had taken only 16 minutes.

        Without any mishaps, the Hudson touched down at 12:42 as the log book shows, which was 2 hours 16 minutes after the sighting. Their return was earlier than expected and there was quite a flurry of excitement. The armourers were told to reload the bombs and the excitement grew. But in minutes a jeep appeared and Stutt and the crew were whisked away to the Operations Hut. Stutt was debriefed and the navigation log was studied by the Officer. Stutts full report. Sighted Japanese force- 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 seaplane tenders or gunboats - position 0459 S - 156-07E - course 120 degrees - at 15 knots, was immediately radioed to headquarters. The message also included: 2 submarines, course 150 degrees in position 0235S - 154E, 2 sticks of bombs dropped. Stutt could not verify that one submarine was hit.

        The record of this report being received appears in the Operation Record Book of Headquarters North Eastern area of 8th August 1942. In listing the submarines sighted and attacked, it added "nil hits".

        The sighting report also appears in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters Situation Report No. 330. This report lists the sighting of 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers and 2 possible seaplane tenders. The reference to possible gunboats was deleted in this Situation Report.

        The second Hudson, A16-185 piloted by Lloyd Milne left Fall River at approximately the same time as A16-218 on a different search pattern. However it overlapped a portion of Stutt's flight in an area northeast of Kieta on Bougainville Island. At 11 :01am Milne sighted five ships that were part of Mikawa's force. EVidently after intercepting Stutt's message and anticipating further reconnaissance Mikawa had split his force to confuse further sightings. Milne did not break radio silence but returned to Fall River at 2:04pm a little less than two hours after Stutt. He reported his sighting as 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and an unidentified vessel at Latitude 0542S Longitude156.05E, course 280, speed 25 knots. After being debriefed, Milne's report was immediately radioed by Operations at Fall River Base, Milne Bay.

        The MacArthur COMSOWESPAC Situation report 330 of 8th August 1942 lists the message as above giving the time of sighting as 11:01 except it gives the speed as 12 knots. The Operations Record Book of Headquarters North Eastern Area of 8th August 1942 gives the speed of 25 knots but lists 2 destroyers instead of light cruisers.

        For some reason, there seems to have been a delay of many hours before Crutchly and Turner received the Hudsons sighting reports though Crutchly stated later he had the reports in the afternoon.

        Contrary to the historians, the record shows that the Hudsons wasted no time on their patrols. Stutt broke radio silence in trying to get out his message and both Hudsons returned promptly to base and immediately gave their verbal reports. The records show that Stutt and Milne did a proper, professional job in reporting their sightings. In fact the entire 32nd Squadron including the two Hudsons, received a" Letter of Commendation" from Major General Kenny on MacArthur's staff in recognition of " its excellent work in the Port Moresby area from 1st August 1942 to 5th September 1942." The only fault lay with Stutt's identification of two of Mikawa's ships as seaplane tenders which led to faulty conclusions but which could have been corrected later by further reconnaissance which did not take place. In fact Milne's sighting at 11:01am was the last sighting while Mikawa steamed boldly down the "Slot" without air cover.

        The purpose of this writing is to lift the cloud of blame that hung over the heads of crews of the Australian Hudsons for over 40 Years. It is to present the account of the flights as stated by William J Stutt and other members of the crew and to reference the documentary evidence of their compatriots laboriously exhumed from old dusty files that confirmed the accounts. It is not to affix blame but it does raise questions:
    • Would Stutt's identification of the ships in Mikawa's force have been more accurate if he had been briefed on the landings in progress on Guadalcanal and Tulagi?
    • Why were there no follow up flights from Milne Bay or MacArthur's air force?
    • What would have been different if Crutchly and Turner had received the reports much earlier?
    • Would the situation have been changed if Rear Admiral McCain had sent word that his requested special flight had to be cancelled?
    • What would have happened if Vice Admiral Fletcher had not pulled out his carriers earlier than originally planned?
    • Would the action have been different if the covering force remained at Condition I and not set Condition II with only half the crew on station and half the guns manned?

        We have to thank W F Martin Clemens, Mrs Lloyd Milne, G Herman Gill, A J Sweeting, Sadao Seno and others who diligently searched records to furnish the proof that the crews of the Hudsons were not to blame for that Savo Island disaster of 8/9 August 1942.


    Captain Emile L Bonnot USNR (Ret)
    Historian General Emeritus
    Naval Order of the United States

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    5 . Japanese Action Report

              496 Nagae, Hayama-cho
              Kanagawa-ken 240-01, Japan
              15 September 1984
    Mrs. N. Milne
    Aramdale, 3143
    Victoria, Australia

    Dear Mrs. Milne,

    I have received your letter of 24 August concerning the reconnaissance
    carried out by RAAF's Hudsons.

    I have just checked Japanese action reports of Savo Island Battle
    at the Library of War History Department of the National Defense
    where all remaining war documents are kept. Detailed Action
    Reports     of the heavy cruiser, Chokai, Admiral Gunicki Mikawa's flagship, read as follows :
    at 0826 on 8th August 1942 : Sighted an enemy plane Lockheed
    {Hudson} which had shadowed us, at some 3000 [meters] in the
    bearing of 240°, and missed in the bearing of 310° after
    about 10 minutes.
    at 0903: Recognized the plane which had kept shadowing us, and
    drove it off by main battery firings. The plane found our fleet
    Intercepted its report as follows"
      0927 three cruisers, three destroyers, two seaplane tenders
      or gunboats, 0549 S, 156 07E, course 120 at 15 knots.

    Japanese action reports were recorded at Tokyo Time. In the Library,
    besides the Chokai's reports, only heavy cruiser, Kako's reports
    have been kept, among those cruisers and destroyers that joined the
    Savo Island Battle. The cruiser Chokai was east of Bougainville
    when she drove the Hudson off by firing around 0920 (Tokyo time).
    I can't pick up a record of a cruiser, west of Bougainville, firing at
    Hudson at 0945 local time.
    IJN Chokai
    Wishing you completion of your interesting research,
              Sincerely yours,
              Sadao Seno


    Handwritten note : Later letter says "Kako" makes no report of Hudsons
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    6 . Letter of Commendation ; No 32 Squadron

    HEADQUARTERS
    ALLIED AIR FORCES
    SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA
    OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
    MELBORNE So1

    201.22

    hudson crew SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation.

    TO     : Commanding Officer, No. 32 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force.

    1 . I wish to take this opportunity to commend No. 32 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, for its excellent work in the Port Moresby Area from August 1, 1942 to September 5, 1942.

    2 . Your organization has made an enviable record during this period by completing 155 reconnaissance sorties for a total of 1037 flying hours. The fact that the Squadron carried out missions every day during this entire period shows that it has the will and determination to overcome all obstacles. Your attack missions resulted in heavy damage to an enemy cruiser, barges, transport and stores. Particular alertness was shown when one of the crews dropped bombs on an enemy submarine.

    3 . The courage and determination with which these numerous operations were carried out during this period were a contributing factor to the successes of our combined Allied Forces.
              GEORGE C. KENNEY,
              Major General,
              Commander.
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    7 . Events Contributing to Defeat

    EXTRACTS FROM EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE OFFICIAL ENQUIRY



    1 . On the morning of August 8th 1942 Admiral Turner requested Admiral McCain to
    authorize a supplemental search which could have sighted the strike force of Admiral
    Mikawa, this search was never carried out and Admiral Turner was not informed
    consequently he assumed that it had been done and that there was nothing to report.

    COMMENT -- Doesn't this incident require a more critical analysis than Morison’s inability to condemn Admiral McCain for his failure in the first instance for not carrying out the requested search and secondly for not advising Admiral Turner of his reason for not believing such a search was necessary. Lack of communication and co-operation between the controlling authorities appears to be highly significant.

    2 . Two Bl7s made only a portion of a requested search and missed Mikawa by 60 miles. Admiral Turner assumed the search had been completed without any sighting

    COMMENT -- Communication breakdown again. Was it common for aircraft to not complete their patrol if there was no apparent emergency. Perhaps Morison could have used the same criticism he applied to the Hudson crew.

    3 . Morison writes" The third sighting by the Australian Hudson at 1026 on 8th August 1942 would have been the tip off but for several unfortunate circumstances. The pilot of this plane, instead of breaking radio silence to report as he had orders to do in an urgent case or return to base which he could have done in 2 hours, spent most of the afternoon completing his search mission, came down at Milne Bay, had his tea, then reported his contact. About sundown August the 8th this vital information was finally sent to Townsville, which originated a dispatch to General MacArthur's headquarters at Brisbane. From that moment there was prompt action, Radio Canberra at 1817 put the contact on "Bells," from which Admiral Crutchley got it at 1839,Canberra also sent it to Pearl Harbour, ,where it was placed on "Fox," from which Admiral Turner got it at 1845.Thus it took over 8 hours to pass ultra hot intelligence only 350 miles from a search plane to the Allied Flagship. If the pilots report had been made by radio, MacArthur could have sent out a search mission to track the ships and bombers to harass them. If the aviator had flown back to base immediately and his report had been transmitted promptly, Turner could have requested additional searches from that side. And any such search, despite foul weather in the Slot ,might with fair luck have corrected another fatal defect, the unfortunate wording of the Australian pilot's report."Three cruisers, three destroyers ,two seaplane tenders or gunboats, course 120 degrees, speed 15 knots."

    COMMENT -- Morison’s first fabricated version of events is formulated without any consultation with any of the Hudson Crew or any documented evidence to substantiate his claims. Details of the identity and location of all the crew were readily available through the correct channels in Australia however Morison's blindfolded journalism is the tool of an inept historian calculated to hide the truth and divert the readers attention away from evidence which would place responsibility squarely on the shoulders of those in command.

    4 . Morison claims" The failure in ship identification and communication are enough to explain why Mikawa managed to make his approach undetected."

    COMMENT -- Morison endeavouring again to establish in the mind of the reader that the Hudson crew were the villains, this in spite of the fact that the requested follow up reconnaissance was not carried out and the decision makers did not consider it important enough to advise Admiral Turner

    5 . No battle plan or instruction was signaled to either the Northern or Southern forces. Morison writes-No battle plan or instructions were signaled to either of these two forces. Presumably Ralph Talbot and Blue would give adequate warning of approaching enemy ships, but as Admiral Crutchley had never found opportunity to confer with the captains of the three Northern Cruisers, they had no idea how he expected them to fight a battle that might be forced upon them. Their situation was not improved by the fact that Crutchley, for no fault of his own, was absent during the battle.

    COMMENT -- One should expect to be able to have faith in the competence of Admirals placed in command especially in a combat situation. The possibility/probability of an enemy surface attack on the 8th/9th of August 1942 should have sounded the alarm. Accounts given at the inquiry into this whole debacle indicate that junior officers had estimated the Japanese strike force could be in an attack position by the early hours of the 9th of August.
    Admiral Turner admitted the possibility of a surface attack but was satisfied all was in readiness to meet it.

    6 . William Greenman captain of Astoria said he had the enemy sighting report in the morning of the 8th.Morison states he was probably mistaken even though Mikawa had copied the Hudson's transmission in addition to a listening watch in Melbourne. Greenman also stated that he figured out that the attacking force could arrive during the mid-watch. He therefore made a note of this in his night order book and turned in. The Astoria report also says they had received information regarding the enemy force during the day. At the time of the attack the captain was turned in. Quincy paid no attention to plane contacts, or to flares over the transport area. The captain of Canberra had also turned in. Only one of the five captains of the heavy ships was present on the bridge. It is noted that the captains of two of the three cruisers sunk had been in their ships only a very short time.

    COMMENT -- Morison again creating doubt about the validity of the claim that radio silence had been broken even though the enemy had verified the transmission. Morrison was also loathe to accept the evidence of William Greenman, Captain of the Astoria. To Morrison the possibility that the Hudson crew had in fact performed their task correctly and in a professional manner was going to question the validity of any of his future statements not supported by documented evidence.

    7 . Vincennes had two reports during the afternoon of August 8th of the approaching Japanese force.
        Canberra had the report during daylight hours and estimated the attackers could be in the transport area by increasing speed to 25 knots.
        Commander Mesley states -"There had been some reports of enemy surface craft received during the day. Two that came from submarines I had plotted. They came after dark. The third one came from aircraft and the position given was practically the same as the other two reports. I asked the captain if he wished to see it on the chart. He said "no" I actually looked at the chart myself to check on the latitude and longitude. I didn't apply it. The captain's opinion, discussed with me, was that all these reports referred to normal inter-island traffic. He actually mentioned that at Navy Office Melbourne there were constant reports of similar traffic. I realized myself, that it would be possible for any of the ships mentioned in these reports to arrive in the transport area before dawn if they increased speed sufficiently. The actual speed required was 23 knots I think. The reports had their speed at 12 to 15 knots"
        Commander Mesley was asked, "Did you feel in your mind that you were fully informed of what reconnaissance was being carried out?" He responded "Definitely not, Sir. Our knowledge was absolutely incomplete. Task force 61,Consisting of three aircraft carriers and numerous destroyers were in the vicinity-but we knew nothing. We didn't know what patrols they were carrying out"
        He stated that he had not heard that various aircraft had been heard from the bridge during the night before the action.
        Commander Wight stated that he heard an aircraft flying overhead at approximately 0100 and reported it down the voice -- pipe to the captain -- I thought there was every possibility of it being friendly. I remarked to the officer of the watch that it was probably one of our own reconnaissance aircraft lost its way.
        Morison claims that the information was sent to Townsville about sundown on the 8th August.
        One report claims that Admiral Crutchley received sighting details at 1839 and another report said "during the day"
        Admiral Turner received the report at 1845
        "Night Action off Savo Island 9/8/42 Appendix No 5" Admiral Crutchley reports - "It is possible that the enemy force consisted of cruisers and destroyers of the force reported by aircraft at 2325Z17 in position 05degrees 49S 156degrees 07E, course 120 degrees, speed 15 knots. At 25 knots and passing through Bougainville Strait, these cruisers and destroyers could reach Guadalcanal at the time an enemy force was actually there. The two seaplane tenders, I suggest, had the aircraft, which dropped the flares
        The report reveals that Rear Admiral Crutchley as Commander. Task Group 62.6 was in receipt of full enemy intelligence. Also that Admiral Tumer, U.S.N.Commander Task Group 62 had decided that this small Japanese force would not attack the vastly superior Allied Force

    COMMENT -- Despite the sighting report being received by so many ships "during daylight hours" no-one seemed to take the warning seriously and Admiral Crutchley has actually conceded that seaplane tenders could have conceivably formed part of the 8 ships as reported by the Hudson Crew a report which drew such negative criticism regarding their ship identification. [A subject which was not part of any phase of their training] Admiral Turner considered this sighting as "Ultra Hot Intelligence" why then did he not impart his classification of this sighting to the captains of all the ships at Savo? Perhaps it would have instilled a feeling of some urgency in place of complacency and maybe even a different end result to the conflict

    8 . Commander Wight stated that the presence of aircraft overhead was recorded on the night of the 8th of August between 2300 and 0100 and also on the night of 7th of August. The possibility of these being enemy aircraft carrying out reconnaissance appears to have been overlooked.

    COMMENT -- The mind boggles to think that the enemy could penetrate security and over-fly the fleet showing their running lights advising Mikawa of the disposition of all the Allied ships and then dropping flares to illuminate the target area.

    9 . Greenman captain of Astoria ordered his crew to cease-fire even though he was under attack. His order to continue firing came too late his ship was destroyed. 216 of his men lost their lives and 186 were wounded
    Equally remiss was Chicago's Captain Bode, his ship had been crippled by a torpedo strike and the main battle had moved on to the north west leaving Captain Bode bewildered and slowly steaming in the wrong direction but what was even worse Captain Bode failed to alert the Vincennes group o fthis attack

    COMMENT -- How can one comment about such abject stupidity demonstrated by the captain's of these two ships Captain Bode should have followed the example of the Hudson Crew by making a sighting report. Morison seems to have some difficulty recognising right from wrong.

    10 . Admiral Hepburn and Commander Ramsey traveled all over the Pacific to talk with the principal officers involved in the Battle of Savo Island and the events leading up to it to obtain their statements. They concluded that the primary cause of the defeat was "The complete surprise achieved by the enemy" the reason for that surprise they listed as follows in order of importance.
      [a] Inadequate condition of readiness on all ships to meet a sudden night attack
      [b] Failure to recognise the implications of the presence of enemy planes in the vicinity previous to the attack.
      [c] Misplaced confidence in the capabilities of radar installations on Ralf Talbot and Blue.
      [d] Failure in communications to give timely receipt of vital enemy contact information.
      [e] Failure in communications to give timely information of the fact that there had been practically no effective reconnaissance covering enemy approach during the day of August 8th

    As a contributory cause must be placed the withdrawal of the carrier group on the evening before the battle this was responsible for Admiral Turner's conference and for the fact there was no force available to inflict damage on the withdrawing enemy.

    COMMENT -- Admiral Crutchley declared, "Despite the grievous losses that night, some consolation could be gleaned from the battle our force did achieve our object which was to prevent the enemy from reaching the transports"
        With all due respects to the Admiral his comment is a pipe dream. The only thing, which stopped the transports from suffering the same humiliating decimation, was a mistake by Mikawa who decided to totally withdraw instead of continuing his attack at Guadalcanal. The Admiral knows that had Mikawa pressed on to that area the result of an Allied loss in operations there may well have changed the course of the war at that time

       It is with deep concern that I have to say the only reports of Morison and Newcombe in which I am prepared to place any faith are those copied from verified documents, which leave no scope for them to adopt the attitude of "Why kill a good story by telling the truth" The book titled "The Tide At Sunset" sums up the feelings of my crewmates and I–quote At Guadalcanal, no one took the message very seriously. The Japanese force was thought to be part of the normal inter-island traffic, or at the worst something to worry about in a day or two. But someone had to become a scapegoat; Stutt and his crew were chosen. Stutt, it was said, had failed to break radio silence and had continued his reconnaissance for hours. When he got back to Milne Bay, so the story went -- and into the official histories -- he had some apple pie and a cup of tea before going to the debriefing. The story had no basis in fact. [the continuation of this extract is part of my contribution to the book on behalf of all the crew] "It is glaringly evident that Morison, [The US Naval Historian] for reasons best known to himself, or in an endeavour to cover up apparent inadequacies in the American war machinery of the day, searched for a scapegoat, says Geddes, but the inaccuracies in his report, although strongly worded and incriminating, made it obviously clear that his research was halfhearted and insincere. The Australians bitterness is undiluted even to-day. What Morison reported others followed, including Richard Newcombe in his book on "The Battle of Savo Island" Contrary to the comments of Richard Newcombe, whose handling of the truth is, to say the least, careless, says Geddes. the lessons of air reconnaissance, so bitterly learned throughout the war, were implemented. One could not be blamed for suspecting Richard Newcombe read Samuel Morrison's "History" and in using the spate of unreliable and inaccurate information endeavours to suggest authenticity by quoting the base principals of action to be taken when a sighting is made. What he seemed to forget were fundamental principles of good historical reporting,.i.e. accuracy, authenticity and above all truth ".,
        No doubt, someone had to be blamed for the disasters that lay ahead and the Australian airmen were fair game.
        I find it hard to believe that there is any justifiable reason why Hepburn and Ramsey chose not to interview members of the Hudson Crew. It is now 8th April 2009, 60 years after the first historical record "History of United States Naval Operations In World War l l- volume 5 - The Struggle For Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943." was launched by Morison to educate the world about how the culpable action of an RAAF Hudson crew{an action proved and documented to be untrue}influenced the ultimate outcome which was the decimation of the Allied fleet.
        An American Admiral with a very forgettable name made a statement about the Hudson crew, "They were not very intelligent but at least they were able to count to eight." This from a person we had never met. Not exactly a member of the intelligentsia capable of expressing an informed opinion.
        In view of the foregoing shouldn't the Hudson crew be applauded for a job well done. The truth of their actions is well documented, even by the enemy whereas the integrity of Morison and Newcombe is demonstrably questionable. They blatantly distorted the truth of the original sighting and denigrated the crew.
        In 1949 Morison's book became a reference medium for scholars, Sixty years is a long time to wait for a political acknowledgement of this injustice and for the American Official War History to be revised to confirm the truth of this event.
       This chronicle of events is not world shattering news now although at the time of publication it did have world attention and since then books have been written on the subject to try and clarify the pretentious journalism of Morison and Newcombe. President Bush either did not see my communication to him or did not believe it worthy of comment. It is my fervent hope that President Obama whom I consider to be "A man of the People" will momentarily place himself at my level understand my concerns and honour me with his support, then Bill Stutt, Eric Geddes, Wilbur Courtis, and John Bell will be able to leave to their descendents an untarnished record of their service.

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    8 . Additional Comments
    Eric asked your webmaster to make comment on his presentation. Here it goes.


    Morison wrote 15 volumes and is bound to have some mistakes. This is one of them. That he created the story of the aircrew going to tea is a horrible example of an author forgetting he is a historian and making up an interesting bit of color, unthinkingly creating a decades long slur upon a responsible air crew.

    It is always true after the fact that what did happen could be seen from the known information -- if all irrelevant information is eliminated and a relevant information is properly emphasized. The truth is that massive amounts of information are processed and the man on the spot has to make his pick-and-chose while being confronted with various urgencies and against a background other things going on at the same time and against the officer's experience with incorrect, partial, and assumed conditions and a hierarch of sources that may or may not be correct, including that higher authority has more information than the locals do.

    Three defending allied fleets -- north south and east -- were charged with defeating three types of attacks.
    • air -- savage air attacks had been occurring for two days, the fleet was relieved to to not have this fear at night and could get some rest.
    • submarines -- the defense was radar and sonar and both were active, however the state of the technology was not perfected and was interfered with by local bad weather and images from nearby islands. All that could be done was being done.
    • surface attack -- primary defense was long range reconnaissance and short range radar. The Allied forces were stronger than any reported contacts. Half the gun stations were manned while the other half got their first good night's sleep.
    That a captain is not active on the bridge is no evidence of complacency. Nor were single aircraft at night a rare occurrence. For example, "Washing Machine Charles" safely overflew Guadalcanal every night to disrupt the marine's sleep. Flares were dropped in coordination with targeting with the attack, not in advance for observation

    Victory often depends on luck. This night all luck was on the Japanese side. 1. Radar was interfered with. The few ships with radar were positioned, but bad weather and nearby islands created unreliable images. 2. The transport, George F. Elliot, had been hit during the massive Japanese air attacks and set on fire and beached, thereby creating a lighted background horizon to outline the US ships to the arriving Japanese cruisers. 3. The Japanese knew where the Allies were and sighted them and the excellent Japanese torpedoes were in the water before the Allied lookouts sighted the Japanese fleet. In fact the flash of the torpedo launchs was probably what alerted lookouts. General Quarters was sounded and the big guns were being swung to bear when the first torpedoes hit and knocked out power an started leaks. As soon as the torpedoes hit, the closing Japanese fleet turned on the search lights and released an armor piercing cannonade upon the spotlighted Allied fleet.

    Concerning the air force identification of individual ship types of the eight ships in VAdm Mikawa's fleet. Recall that Japanese planes at Coral Sea identified tanker, Neosho, and destroyer, Sims, as a carrier and a cruiser. Identifying a ship from above is not easy, they are all long, narrow, with a pointy end in front and a wake coming from the back. Camouflage paint is designed to make this even more difficult. And specially hard to identify are those with flashes of gunfire directed at the observer.

    One of the greatest fears of any warrior is to inflect death and damage of on some of their own. To ship captains being attacked without warning of any enemy, a logical possibility of friendly fire. It happens. To stop for a moment to gather information is prudent. Sharing information is also prudent. The nearby, and soon to be destroyed, northern fleet has no idea that a major battle was being fought in their neighborhood and we almost equally taken by surprise.

    To blame Fletcher who was returning from the far end of his nightly travel is a fraud. He could not have prevented the destruction at Savo. The only issue is if the embarrassment of the Navy might have been mitigated if he had been closer and IF able to make contact. That is a big IF, the Japanese raiders had several hours head start before daylight and were withdrawing into an area of Japanese island airfields Fletcher was charged with destroying the Japanese carrier fleet, not risking his own limited number of carriers to chase after a few cruisers while within range of withering air attack. He used these US carriers to defeat the Japanese counter attack two weeks later and thereby saved the beachhead at Guadalcanal.

    Admiral Crutchley is correct, two allied fleets were destroyed in saving the transports. Guadalcanal is not just a land battle. More sailors were killed in defending the beachhead in this one night than were all the Marines killed in the entire six months of of the Guadalcanal campaign. Forty-eight warships were destroyed in that campaign, half enemy and half ours -- 3 carriers, 2 battleships, 12 cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 6 submarines.

    There were two RAAF Hudson sightings about an hour apart. Turner's bad guess was doubly wrong. The failure to keep track of eight Japanese warships with followup scouting is inconceivable. McCain was evidently unable to provide any US Navy surveillance -- the reason is unknown to me. The RAAF and USAF observation planes belonged to the Army, Gen. MacArther's SW Pacific command and the Guadalcanal operation was the Navy (Adm .Nimitz/Ghormley) South Pacific command. One command had to ask the other "pretty please, will you help me?", such that nothing additional was done.

    Morison's History is, like the Internet, a good starting point, but each contain errors, bias and contradictions. Morison is confused by simple things like time zones and fuel consumption and he must be read with access to source information. Just referring to other writers is not enough because way too many authors simple follow Morison's lead without original thought. That Morison, a Pulitzer Prise winning historian (but not for his WW2 work), engages in fiction to create local color is disappointing.

    9 . Shedding some Myths about the Battle of Savo Island.

    Conversation with Mackenzie Greorgory, Watch Officer, HMAS Canberra .

    From: Mackenzie Gregory
    Subject: Battle of Savo.
    Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2001 16:23

    Jim,

    Thank you for your gracious response.
    This is going to be a long E-Mail to you and I apologize in advance.

    Here goes:  Morison was published in 1951, Gill in his Vol 2 of the official history of the RAN in WW2. was probably the first to refute the story of the Hudson's role in sighting Mikawa's fleet.

    Two later books published in Australia take up the Savo story.
    1. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "Disaster in the Pacific. New Light on the Battle of Savo Island". Allen & Unwin. Sydney 1992.   [Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992.]
    2. Loxton, B. with Coulthard-Clark, C. "The Shame of Savo. Anatomy of a Naval Disaster". Allen & Unwin. St.Leonards. NSW. 1994..   [Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1994.]
    At the time of Savo, Bruce Loxton was the Captain's Midshipman on Canberra's bridge, he was severely wounded and, I did not think he could survive, but he did, to complete a distinguished Naval career, and retire as a Commodore. His service included a spell as Naval Attaché in Washington D.C. and Director of Naval Intelligence in Australia.

    Bruce lives in Sydney, and I live in Melbourne, the two cities about 500 miles apart. As most of the RAN's records about Savo were housed in archives in Melbourne, I did a good deal of research for Bruce here in Melbourne.

    As we wanted to learn about the Hudson's story first hand, and both the Hudson's pilot and navigator lived in Melbourne, Bruce flew to Melbourne, and we both interviewed former Sergeant Bill Stutt, the pilot, and Wilbur Courtis, the navigator over lunch. We discussed the aircraft's sighting of Mikawa, how they broke wireless silence to make an enemy report, and tried to raise their base at Fall River over a period of time but without success. Post war, it was discovered in RAAF records, in the signal log of ACH Townsville, that from 1032 to 1100, Fall River radio had closed because of an air raid alert.
      Link to Full Web Page, Savo Update

      Notes:
    1. Operation Watchtower is the 1st Marine Division (MGen Vandegrift, USMC) landing on Florida, Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Guadalcanal, in the first American land offensive of the war. Amphibious Force, South Pacific (RAdm Turner, TF-62,) with screening force (RAdm Crutchley, RN) landed the leathernecks under cover of naval surface and air forces (VAdm Fletcher). Landings are supported by carrier aircraft (RAdm Noyes) and shore-based aircraft (RAdm McCain). Overall Commander South Pacific Force is VAdm Ghormley; officer in tactical command is VAdm Fletcher.
    2. The Imperial Japanese Eighth Fleet was commanded by VAdm Mikawa with his flag on Chokai consisted of:
      Heavy Cruiser Division 6 (RAdm Goto) on Aoba with Furutaka, Kako, and Kinugasa,
      Light Cruiser Division 18 (RAdm Matsuyama) on Tenryu with Yubari,
      Screen destroyer Yunagi.
    3. Americans understand "tea" to be an afternoon meal in which the beverage drunk is unimportant.
    4. The floatplane version of the Zero fighter is a Nakajima A6M2-N "Rufe" with a speed of 271 mph, range 1,100 miles, and armament of one 7.7mm and two 20mm; used in the Solomons.
    5. The Lockheed Hudson was a militarized Super Electra passenger liner (Army A-29, Navy PBO-1) for maritime reconnaissance with a top speed of 246 mph, a range of 1,960 miles, and armament of 2 forward firing 7.7mm and usually a dorsal turret with two 7.7mm (.303 cal) and depth charges. The Solomon's are 1,200 miles from Australia, so Fall River airfield was at Milne Bay, New Guinea rather than near Townsville, Australia.
    6. The time zone changes in the vast Pacific is a worthy point. Also, the international date line separates Washington and Hawaii from Tokyo and Sydney.
    7. The Pacific War zones of control were separated between Army (MacArthur in Australia) with the Southwest Pacific and the Navy (Nimitz in Hawaii) with the North, Central and South Pacific. Operation Watchtower, a navy operation, required moving the line of demarcation from 160 degrees west to 158 degrees west. The search area overlapped command responsibilities in addition to time zones.
    8. In defense of Morison (Naval Historian): the Hudson's saw the task force and the information did not get to the fleet off Savo Island. Delete the part about going to "tea" and replace it with a radio station off the air from an air raid alert or an ignorant debriefing officer. Further study might even find a reason for the apparent arrogance of the debriefing officer; few servicemen in combat zones are intentionally obstructive.1
    9. LCDR Gregory's web page makes note that USAAF B-17's also saw the Japanese 8th fleet. McCain had responsibility for both US Army and Navy shore based aircraft, but the Australian planes belonged to SW Pacific area, a separate chain of command.
    10. Australian planes of MacArthur's SW Pacific command flying out of an emergency field on the tip of New Guinea, the Hudson's sighting report path was : by radio from Milne Bay to Port Moresby to Townsville to Brisbane ; then by motor cycle to MacArthur's HQ, by phone to Canberra, and finally by radio to the fleet for decoding and delivery to the flag officer along with dozens of other messages. The elapsed time until Turner received the message was about seven and a half hours, during which time Fletcher withdrew the carrier fleet from the confines of Solomons into the Coral Sea.
      -----
      1. Tony writes -- " I was a postwar member of the Royal Australian Air force. In the course of my training I was informed that the reason that the debriefing officer had a mind block about believing a pilot's report of sighting a Japanese cruiser force heading towards Savo was that MacArthur's headquarters had been so tight with security on the US landings that they had not even informed the Australian air force that they were planned or had taken place. The plane was on a routine mission unconnected with the landings. Likely result could be that the de briefing officer could see no rational reason for such a Japanese force heading south ,and he certainly had tried to rationalize the report as a sighting of routine inter island traffic with perhaps seaplane carriers included. The sighting report was radioed in clear as the pilot knew he had been sighted by the Japanese cruisers, he could well be shot down and there was no point in coding his message as the Japanese would be well aware of what message he would be sending."
      Grahm writes -- " My great uncle was the wireless operator in Stutt's crew. Radio silence was well and truly broken on this occasion as he broadcast the warning in plain language due to the fact that the Japanese were trying to shoot them down. However the signals were unfortunately not taken seriously by those that received them."
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    Last updated on May 26, 2010 -- original.
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