More than sixty years have passed since the days of Fletcher. More than thirty have passed since his death. Literally tons of books have been published about Pearl Harbor and Midway, two of the most important events in the days of Fletcher, so the author considers, even though the admiral wasn't on the base when the cunning attack took place. A lot of answers are given in the first part to the all the whys that come up from a rational point of view. But . . . what new information can be said about this period ? Is it really possible to blame Franklin Delano Roosevelt, without having made a serious analysis, of the death of more than two thousand of his men on board his fleet ? What more can the author convey about the Japanese catastrophe in Midway that hasn't reached the public through fiction and documentary movies or through so many well - documented books and even those written by close actors of the great naval drama of the 4th of June of 1942 ? Obviously, everything has been said, everything has been written and everything has been filmed. The heroes, the leaders, the people in charge, the scoundrels, the victims and the consequences. All registered and learnt. Or not ? The reader would be so surprised, as it happened to the author when he checked that whole batches of truths (or not) went from the reign of the rumor to the paper, without being seriously evaluated. Prejudices, interesting conclusions, meanness, resentments, and a great ignorance came up in history and there they stayed. That history, with its actors, its reporters and its audience, even being the source where the knowledge is searched for and then used as a guide for the future, accumulates this vital knowledge, stuffed with flaws, mistakes, and the weaknesses of the men.
In this literary work, this is exactly what is analyzed. How the personal objectives, and the weaknesses and miseries, master the scene and manage to get the actors to lead the world in this or that direction, without caring very much about the real interests of the nation and the tormented humanity. It's not an easy task, to detect these subordinate actions, explain them to the reader, whose feelings have the heroes clinging to them and cover them with a protective shield from which loyalties surge, ready to fight with outrage, for the memory of their cherished national heroes. The innocence of Layton while stating his annoyance at it being irreversible that Jack was senior and should have the command, without considering that it was a very convenient fact, given his experience, exposes the childish necessity and generalization of the myth, and the elected hero was Spruance. Who could think of denying him the victory at Midway? But if the actors have been human, human were and are the journalists, reporters and historians, many times writing what can flatter their champion or obtaining lightly pondered conclusions or, what is sadder and more serious, saying what they believe or know what the masses will like more and, in that way, attract them to the enclosure of his fame and his box office. Because the truth can usually be very hurtful and the dollars don't come from hurtful pockets.
About Pearl Harbor, what first appears and what this book attacks right away, are the personal motives that challenge (or not?) the national objectives. Maybe it's comfortable to think that Yamamoto was a patriot that played a desperate card, because his bosses, surrounded by the "evil" Roosevelt, desperately needed the elements that he denied them.
The author takes the opposite stance and concludes that maybe things weren't exactly that way, and furthermore, if FDR had all the information, and didn't prevent the attack, it's because, based on this same information, he could speculate that he wouldn't be attacked, and he had, from his post, all the right to do so, but officers like Kimmel or like Short, didn't and they should have been better prepared.
And above all other issues, having the information is one feature and, knowing something, is quite another. But the nucleus of the setting out of this story isn't Pearl Harbor, but the "days of Fletcher". And in the days of Fletcher, the position of the prince is taken by "that jewel of courage, craftiness and heroism"which the battle of Midway was, and certainly, the man that won it. But . . . , what new information could be said? It's ridiculously ironic, that the only new issue orbits around one word : Fletcher. Nobody speaks of Fletcher. But yes, it's been analyzed if Halsey would have been better than Spruance in the command of TF16, and really successful writers like Buell and Lundstrom spent such amounts of ink that it would have made Morison nervous - he who felt nervous about the amount of fuel that Fletcher loaded -- to demonstrate to the world that the idea of launching the planes of TF16 from the maximum distance belonged to Spruance and not to his Chief of Staff, Browning. And that . . . what can it matter ? The novelty of this book is to teach that it doesn't matter who has the idea, but who takes the risk to put it into practice, which is the commander. And in TF16, the commander was RAdm Raymond Spruance and what went well or bad in the launching, is his exclusive responsibility, basically for taking the decision. But, the only really important issue was the destruction of the four Japanese aircraft carriers, and it's the only event that isn't properly analyzed. Nobody has studied the difficult strategic decisions that the Senior Officer, Fletcher, had to take to place the great tactician Spruance, in an advantageous launching position. Nobody knew how to show the really extraordinary teamwork performed by TF17 by managing from Yorktown the exploration and carrying out the cover of TF16, in a manner to keep away from Spruance all the concern about the enemy aircraft carriers, whose position was unknown, leaving his hands and mind free to carry out the task assigned to him by Fletcher. Nobody noticed the remarkable handling of time done by Jack Fletcher, from the historic and perfect (and never before analyzed) order to Spruance at 0607 (Proceed SW . . . etc.) to the one of: "start engines" to his own air group at 0833. And much less still, the ignored fact that with only 35 aircraft, so as always to maintain a reserve, his Yorktown managed to sink an aircraft carrier, while Spruance used 121 to sink two (58%). But the pearl of his performance was the separation of the carriers, "the visionary decision that finally won the battle". All the talent of Fletcher wasn't enough to make them talk today of the only important event of that battle, that which changed the development of the war and the luck of the Allied : the destruction of the aircraft carriers. But Ray's charisma was enough for the generations to study his decisions, taken when the battle, with the Japanese aircraft carriers sunk, had finished. The only thing Spruance offered was to avoid the nighttime action while the adversary withdrew.
What would have happened if Nagumo's ships had attacked the West Coast, instead of going to Midway ? This was in the mind of people as important as King and Marshall, and also of Nimitz as we will see, but not in the mind of the reporters. Japan delayed changing its codes after Coral Sea; couldn't Midway have been a trap? Jack took special care of this.
How did Jack solve, in minutes, and under combat conditions, the fact that only two aircraft carriers showed up when four or maybe five were expected ? Nobody says anything.
Nobody talked about the decision matrix, and no doubt, the historians didn't even know what it was about. Nobody analyzed the mental preparation that a leader must have - and Fletcher had it - to hand over the tactical command, while retaining the responsibility, to another officer, expert in a certain topic (Fitch in the Coral Sea), or to decide between two opposing objectives so as to concentrate on one of them and assign the other to his second in command (Spruance in Midway). Seldom is considered how very important it must be to train the minds of the officers, so as to rapidly make these evaluations and, with the pressure of the battle on them, assign and transfer power of decision in the vital moments. It won't be so easy to train them so that, as Jack, they give, without hesitating, the objective of most brilliance to their subordinates, if in that way a larger benefit is assured to the interests of the Nation or of the service.
While taking a book to the reader, the thought always arises : What will be its usefulness ? This work highlights the less known everyday aspects of the important commanders as, for example, the noteworthy influence that individuals of a much lower level can have on their decisions, for the simple fact of being most of the day close to them. And this also deals at great length with the psychological aspect, especially in Yamamoto, Nimitz and King. The book tries to emphasize how the dangerous dichotomy considered in "what is worth"and "what looks good"or in how "talent and personality"can influence the development of events. The final judge of all the activity, which is to say, the public, possesses a blissful innocence and those men that do things must waste their time in trying to sell their achievements, so they aren't displaced from their chief positions, because that great judge is guided in his understand by the personality of an individual and not by his talent. This may not be able to be repaired, but those that lead the great organizations don't have the right to fall into the naivety of the public, and the storytellers don't have that right either.
Topics that haven't been properly taught are considered,
such as, "who wins the battles?", and the important homogeneity in the education of the staff of officers and the danger that people with ongoing personal assertions remain in responsible places of power. The psychological study of who gets to fill key positions, even though he isn't proposed in a direct way, he is continually in an indirect way. The problems generated by the presence of a character of the stature of Ernest King, and his influence on commanders of the type of a Nimitz, are exposed, and are a permanent warning, how the process of building the objectives in the minds of the great leaders, in all types of big organizations, must be worked from the psychological aspect.
The difficult struggle of the author of this book, is that in the appraisal of leaders, only what is of value and not what shines should be taken into account, and only the talent be considered and the charisma be left aside, as long as that charisma is not taken advantage of as a basic tool of leadership.
The battle is knowing that a enormous injustice has been committed with an irreproachable man ; this may serve to help us not repeat similar mistakes in the future.
Andrés M. Lazarus del Castillo
E-mail :
Translated by Carlos Viborg Bahnson
Comments from the Cover Pages of the Book.
"Morison, long after his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of World War II was published, admitted, he was unjustified in his critical remarks about Fletcher, and he added a footnote in later editions of his series citing some of his earlier errors."(Stephen D. Regan. "In bitter tempest". Iowa State Press. 1995 "Wake").
"Frank Jack Fletcher commanded aircraft carrier task forces from mid-December 1941 to late September 1942, without so much as a shore leave or long rest. He fought the battles of Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons, sinking four large Japanese carriers and two small ones, and losing two of his carriers. In final review, he had inflicted more than twice the damage he took and never clearly lost a battle. Surprisingly, his career has lacked thorough examination. Quite to the contrary, superficial and highly biased reporting of his actions especially by the Dean of U.S. Navy historians, Samuel Elliot Morison, has resulted in him being generally regarded as a very mediocre commander". (Tim Lanzendoerfer http://www.microworks net/pacific/library/review_bittertempest.htm).
"Morison, long after his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of World War II was published, admitted, he was unjustified in his critical remarks about Fletcher, and he added a footnote in later editions of his series citing some of his earlier errors."(Stephen D. Regan. "In bitter tempest". Iowa State Press. 1995 "Wake").
"History has not been kind to Fletcher, but the fact remains that under his command US carrier task forces sank five Japanese carriers and damaged two more, all in the first nine months of the war". (www.CV6.org/noumea /)
"The role of Fletcher as superior commander of the Carrier Striking Force has been minimized in most of the stories about Midway" (John Lundstrom).
"The results of the Coral Sea battle were, in part, a result of boldness and audacity on the part of Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, who ordered an attack with forces that were weaker than those of the enemy, a concept not envisaged under current fleet doctrine. Clearly Admiral Fletcher knew when and how to deviate from published doctrine". (James J. Tritten. "Winning the war in the Pacific. Strategic Lessons for today". http://www.stormingmedia.us/57/5794/A579492.html Doctrine.
". . . My generation of naval officers owes much to those who led the US out of dark days following Pearl Harbor to the greatest naval triumph of modern times, and Admiral Fletcher left a great legacy."(Captain Bruce Bade. Director of Armament Pacific Cooperation. USD. Pentagon. Wahington D.C.)
"Finally the epic efforts of Adm Fletcher get the attention they deserve, he fought against overwhelming odds with only the remnants of a peacetime navy in the early days when we were losing the Pacific War, yet he stopped the advance on Australia at Coral Sea, he destroyed the enemy\'s offensive capabilities at Midway, and saved Guadalcanal at the Eastern Solomons. History prefers to remember the overwhelming victories that came later, but this man fought and won when the odds were the wrong way". (Jim Bauer, webmaster, WW2Pacific.com From an email to the author).
"The US Asiatic Fleet, the British Far East Fleet and the Dutch East Indian were destroyed by the Imperial Japanese Navy, without loss to themselves, until they encountered Fletcher". (Jim Bauer. Stopping the Tide. Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher).
"Fletcher did a fine job and exercised superior judgment in his recent cruise to the Coral Sea. He is an excellent seagoing, fighting naval officer and I wish to retain him as a Task Force commander for the future" (Nimitz Letter to King, May 30 1942)
"Rear Admiral Fletcher utilized with consummate skill the information supplied him and, by these engagement in the Coral Sea between 4 and 8 May won a victory with decisive and far reaching consequences for the Allied cause" (Nimitz, C., Sea Report)
"I cannot close without expressing MY ADMIRATION, for the part Fletcher in the Yorktown played in the campaign." (Rear Admiral - then Admiral - Raymond Ames Spruance. Letter to Admiral Nimitz. At sea, close to Midway. June 8, 1942)
"Let we who now presume to judge Admiral Fletcher, hope that we can perform as well, should we be so tested at the onset of a war for national survival." (Lieutenant Commander Butcher Review of Fletcher's Actions Naval War College)
We must all say to Jack Fletcher: "I stand before you today wishing that history could be re-written and knowing that it cannot" (Mrs. Presley Merritt Wagoner, President, General of Daughters of American Revolution to Marian Anderson family)